Safety Board records are replete with aircraft accident reports that attribute inadequate supervision by company management as causal to some degree. This has been going on for years, and yet new reports are still published in which the cause is at partially cited as, "lack of adequate supervision by company management." This is of course baffling, but the fact that it keeps happening means that SOMEONE is not getting the word.
This is sad, because, without debate, thorough supervision of a commercial operator’s aviation program results in a better safety record. The case has been proven. This is true for all areas of commercial flying, including flight schools, corporate, on-demand air taxi, regional and commuters, and the big boys, the Part 121 operators.
After an accident, one of the "hot items" of the Safety Board Investigators is the corporate structure; referred to in the investigator’s checklist as "corporate culture." Part of this involves a detailed examination of the operator’s oversight of training and line flying. Every NTSB investigation of an aircraft accident involving a commercial operator focuses on this area of supervision.
Like most progress in aviation safety, it took a while before the concept of improved management supervision was accepted; however, after a number of crashes were blamed on poor supervision, the more responsible companies started to improve their oversight functions. The big operators, such as the major air carriers, have large staffs, which are now structured in such a way as to provide strong supervision at all levels of operation, from training to on-line operations. Each airplane in the fleet of a large carrier has a fleet manager, who in turn has a staff of assistants, plus instructors specifically assigned to that airplane, on a full-time basis.
If a carrier operates six different makes/models of airplanes, the organization will reflect six fleet managers, under a training manager. This is just for training, and does not include the chief pilot and his staff, which for a large airline might include six or eight bases where flightcrews are based.
As one works down the chain of operators by size, the organization structure also diminishes, and along with that duplication of jobs occur. For instance, in a small Part 135 operation, the chief pilot might also be chief of training, and perform the hiring functions as well. This doubling of duties does necessarily result in a lack of supervision, but the risks increase substantially. Unless the operator is careful with the individuals chosen for such multiple duties, the safety margin of that flight operation can be reduced. This is what the Safety Board has found in too many smaller operators. Duplication of duties and overload of responsibilities onto a few people, usually the result of economic pressures, is at times irresistible. This is especially true when a "hard charger" comes along, who appears to be able to handle everything. Unfortunately, many safety issues can easily slip through the cracks when one or two key people are charged with excessive duties.
The Safety Board found this true in a large regional operator a couple of years ago. The training department became too loosely managed. The carrier operated four different types aircraft, under both Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121 & 135. For economy, the fleet manager positions were eliminated. The NTSB accident report stated: "The director of training.said that no one was specifically in charge of the BE 1900 training program, and no one was assigned to monitor and standardize instructional methods." The instructors, some of them quite young, were not being supervised, and as long as the students passed the check rides, few questions were asked. This caught up with the operator, when one instructor so overloaded a student that control of the airplane was lost by both the student and this instructor. A fatal accident resulted. The investigation revealed that this instructor was known to be conducting questionable training procedures for some time, but the company management failed to oversee his activities. One of the probable causes of this accident was: "...company management’s lack of involvement in and oversight of its Beechcraft 1900 flight training program."
In another accident, an on-demand taxi operator was flying five different makes of airplanes. The accident captain was "current" on all five. A check of his training records revealed that he was barely current in one model, let alone all five. The accident was clearly the result of a lack of adequate management supervision, in that they allowed this pilot to fly all these aircraft, when his proficiency level in each would be quite low.
In yet another recent accident, the company management of a cargo operation, pushed their flightcrew duty periods to such a degree, that even though the flight was technically legal, prudent management should have intervened and stopped the flight because of crew fatigue. Inadequate supervision, again.
Some might be prompted to say, "Blame the FAA." In certain examples that might be a rational response, but in many others, the FAA is not the reason. In recent years, there has been a reduction of FAA Inspectors, particularly in the "operations" category. While this was happening, there has been a plethora of new operators. The result has been an enormous spread of responsibilities on the backs of FAA Operations Inspectors, especially those identified as Principal Operations Inspectors (POI), with oversight responsibilities for more than one operator.
Cases have been found where a POI had over a dozen operators assigned to him/her. The FAA has gone through cycles like this off and on for years. Right now, rumors are flying that more operations inspectors are being hired, after several years of no hiring, despite retirements. Hopefully, this is true and the trend can be reversed.
The FAA cannot be the policeman for all of aviation. Operators must take responsibility for their own safety record. In this day of nearly instant communications, there is no excuse for an operator saying after an accident "I didn’t know about that." Managers must be chosen carefully, and all areas of a company’s operation need to be supervised adequately. A management that fails to heed this advice will be identified, if an accident occurs.
Home ! Search Page ! Master index ! Table of Contents for This Issue