The Supreme Court today (Monday 5.12.97) handed down its decision in Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, and further clarified the test for seaman status set forth in Chandris v. Latsis.
At issue in the case was the meaning of the requirement that a worker have a substantial connection to a vessel or "an identifiable group of vessels" in navigation to be considered a Jones Act seaman..
Papai was a day-laborer who was injured while working aboard one of Harbor Tug's vessels. During the two years leading up to his injury, he worked for a variety of different employers, usually for no more than a few days at a time. He rarely left the dock, and was often hired to chip and paint. On several occasions, however, he did remain on vessels while they were in transit. He never went to sea, however. When not working as a deckhand, Papai was employed as a bartender on shore.
Relying on the Supreme Court's language in Chandris, that a seaman has a substantial connection to a "group of vessels", the Ninth Circuit held that Papai was a seaman. The fact that all vessel owners involved hired Papai out of the same union hall was enough to create an identifiable group of vessels.
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed the doctrinal development set forth in Willander and Chandris, and held that Papai's employment did not satisfy the requirement that a worker's connection to a vessel or fleet be substantial. The court held that where a worker alleges a connection to a fleet of vessels, the fleet must be subject to some degree of common ownership or control:
"An important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker seeking coverage has a substantial connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control. The substantial connection test is important in distinguishing between sea- and land-based employment, for land-based employment is inconsistent with Jones Act coverage. This was the holding in Chandris, and we adhere to it here. The only connection a reasonable jury could identify among the vessels Papai worked aboard is that each hired some of its employees from the same union hiring hall where it hired him. That is not sufficient to establish seaman status under the group of vessels concept."
Also at issue in the case was whether a federal district court could consider the question of seaman status de novo, after an administrative law judge already determined that Papai was not a seaman. The Supreme Court ultimately did not reach this issue, however.
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens dissented.
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