MASTER/PILOT RELATIONSHIP (Fall 98)

State of Alaska v David Renwick, 3AN-94-10412 (Feb 21, 1997)

A recent case arising in Alaska deals specifically with the relationship between compulsory state pilot and the master of a vessel. Because of the importance of this case, large portions of the Supreme Court of Alaska's decision are quoted. Readers on MAC's web page may read the full opinion though our link.

On March 21, 1994, the Japanese master, Captain Yamaguchi, of the M/V REEFER BADGER requested a pilot. The vessel was dragging her anchor in Captain's Bay, near Dutch Harbor, Alaska in severe weather. Because the location was within the compulsory pilotage area, the master needed a pilot to reposition it. Another vessel, the M/V EIYO was anchored nearby.

Pilot Renwick, the assigned state pilot, assumed the "conn" of the vessel upon arrival and safely maneuvered it out of danger at the time. The vessel had two anchors out which were fouled with each other. Renwick then maneuvered the vessel back to her original anchorage and commenced trying to unfoul the anchors. During this procedure, the vessel was set downwind within 230 feet of shore.

Renwick ordered half astern followed by full astern. The court opinion states:

At this time, the M/V EIYO called the REEFER BADGER and warned them that they were coming too close to the EIYO. The Master told the second officer to watch out the back, to check the EIYO's position. The M/V EIYO was located in the center of the bay, and was swinging or "weaving" back and forth in the wind. Renwick was not watching the EIYO, and Captain Yamaguchi notified him of the danger. Renwick told Captain Sanders the next day that he was not sure if the REEFER BADGER had cleared the EIYO before he gave the engine astern order.

The REEFER BADGER reached a state of extremis due to its proximity to the shore and its movement astern toward the M/V EIYO. Captain Crauthers, operator of the pilot boat, testified that if someone had not taken action, the REEFER BADGER would have grounded. The Master testified that he was worried that if he had followed Renwick's astern order, the REEFER BADGER would have collided with the EIYO.

To avoid a collision with the M/V EIYO, the Master countermanded Renwick's astern engine order, rang stop on the telegraph, then rang half ahead, and ordered starboard rudder. The REEFER BADGER then moved away from the EIYO, and turned away from the shore and toward the closed end of the bay.

Renwick testified that he informed the Master that he was leaving the ship. If this statement was made by Renwick, it was not effectively communicated to the Master, who testified that he "did not hear" anything about Renwick leaving.

Renwick called Captain Crauthers on VHF radio, stating, "this thing's about to go aground, I'm not going to be on it when it happens. Come get me." Captain Crauthers maneuvered the [pilot boat] LOWELL S alongside the REEFER BADGER as Renwick made a "hurried exit," leaping from the pilot ladder and landing on his upper chest on the bow of the tug, where a crew member grabbed him to make sure he didn't fall overboard.

The Master succeeded in averting a collision with the EIYO and a grounding on the shore of Captain's Bay, under adverse conditions and in severe weather, while Renwick was not on board.

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In May 1994 the Division of Occupational Licensing (Division) petitioned the Board for an immediate suspension of Renwick's marine pilot license. The Board granted the petition, finding that Renwick's continued licensure "posed a clear and immediate danger to the public health and safety." See AS 08.01.075(c). (EN4) Renwick appealed the suspension and requested a hearing. Testimony was taken and evidence introduced at several hearings. In December 1994 the Board issued a decision in which it found the facts referenced above. The Board upheld the suspension, finding that Renwick violated applicable statutes and regulations by abandoning the REEFER BADGER in mandatory pilotage waters when it was in extremis.

Renwick appealed the Board's suspension order to the superior court. The superior court held that Renwick had no duty to remain on board the REEFER BADGER after the master of the vessel countermanded Renwick's orders. The court reversed the Board's order and directed the Board to vacate its finding that Renwick failed in his duty aboard the Reefer Badger.

The Board appeals.

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The Alaska Marine Pilotage Act (Act) requires vessels traveling through Alaska's inland or coastal waters to employ state-licensed marine pilots for safe navigation. AS 08.62.160. A pilot so employed "has a primary duty to safely navigate vessels under the pilot's direction and control and to protect life and property and the marine environment while engaged in the provision of pilot services." AS 08.62.157(a). The Act gives the Board broad authority to adopt regulations providing for "proper and safe pilotage . . . ." AS 08.62.040(b). Among other regulations, the Board has promulgated 12 AAC 56.960(a), which provides that pilots "shall be on duty piloting the vessel at all times when the vessel is in transit in compulsory pilotage waters." Another regulation, 12 AAC 56.990(14), defines "on duty" to mean "being on the navigating bridge of the vessel and having control of the vessel, or being on the navigating bridge of the vessel and assisting the master or navigational officer." In the present case, the Board concluded that Renwick's "decision to abandon the REEFER BADGER while it was in extremis was in violation of AS 08.62.157, and 12 AAC 56.960(a) as defined by 12 AAC 56.990(14) . . . ."

In reversing the Board, the superior court stated that the legislative history of AS 08.62.157(a) "does not suggest the legislature intended to change the duties of pilots at common law." From this premise, and from the unsupported assumption that at common law pilots had no duty to remain on board a vessel after the master had reasserted command, the superior court concluded that 12 AAC 56.990(14) was "at variance" with AS 08.62.157(a):

The Board [ ] has construed [12 AAC 56.990(14)] to impose a duty upon a marine pilot to remain on board even when, as here, the master has rightfully or wrongfully reasserted his command authority over the vessel. By the same reasoning, one might argue that this definition allows the pilot to meet his obligation to the vessel, its owners and the State of Alaska, by simply standing by and assisting. It is erroneous to do so. That portion of 12 AAC 56.990(14) which reads "being on the navigating bridge of the vessel and assisting the master or navigational officer" is at variance with [AS 08.62.157(a)] and 12 AAC 56.960 if so interpreted. Consistent with the superior court's reasoning, Renwick argues that the Board's definition of "on duty" in 12 AAC 56.990(14) contravenes AS 08.62.157(a).

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We stated in Cosio:

If we find the proper nexus between the Administrative agencies are given wide latitude when they are interpreting statutes they have been charged to administer challenged regulation and the statutory purpose (i.e., the regulation is consistent with the statutory purpose), we do not generally require a separate showing of reasonable necessity. Strictly applied, inquiry into whether a regulation is necessary as a means to a legislative end would mire this court in questions of public policy and the advisability of possible alternatives. Such a searching inquiry is beyond our authority and expertise. It is a rare case where a regulation, although not inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, is wholly superfluous to the achievement of that purpose. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 624 n.1. Thus the review we conduct in this case is a review for consistency with the authorizing statute.

12 AAC 56.960(a) and 12 AAC 56.990(14), when read together, require a pilot to remain on board a vessel and assist in its navigation even if the master of the vessel countermands the pilot's orders. These requirements are consistent with the purpose of the Act. The Act is designed to insure "safe and proper pilotage" upon Alaska's inland and coastal waters. AS 08.62.040(b). Marine pilots are employed because of their "particular knowledge of local conditions." Barbey Packing Co. v. S.S. Stavros, 169 F. Supp. 897, 903 (D. Or. 1959). Because of their familiarity with local conditions, marine pilots are "indispensable" to a vessel's safe passage. Bach v. Trident Steamship Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1991) (Brown, J., dissenting). If pilots were at liberty to jump ship at their choosing, the Board could reasonably conclude that vessels would be left to navigate Alaska's inland waters at their peril, without the valuable knowledge of local conditions pilots offer. The Board's rule arguably furthers the Act's goal of providing safe and proper pilotage by requiring compulsory pilots to remain on the navigating bridge of vessels at all times.

Renwick argues that the Board's rule creates an unacceptable division of authority aboard ship and contravenes the common law rule that a compulsory pilot's orders must be obeyed. It is true that in the ordinary course a compulsory pilot "is in supreme command of the vessel while he is navigating it." Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 1993). However, at common law, the master of the vessel retained the authority to countermand a pilot's orders in limited circumstances. Delta Transload, Inc. v. The Navios Commander, 818 F.2d 445, 451n.17 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he master retains authority to countermand the pilot's orders which would place the vessel in a position of apparent and avoidable danger."); Avondale Indus. v. Int'l Marine Carriers, 15 F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1994) (the master of the vessel "has a responsibility to monitor the pilot's decision making."); Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. State, 768 F.2d 1558, 1576 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[A] pilot's presence on board a vessel does not relieve the master or watch officer of their duties and obligations."); Barbey, 169 F. Supp. at 902 ("[S]hould it be apparent to the master that his vessel is entering a zone of danger and . . . the pilot fail[s] to . . . respond to the situation in a manner which will insure the safety of the vessel, then the master should and must relieve the pilot."); Camp v. The Marcellus, 4 F. Cas. 1141, 1145 (D. Mass. 1860) ("[T]he power of the pilot does not so far supersede the authority of the master, that the latter may not, in case of obvious and certain disability, or gross ignorance and palpable and imminently dangerous mistake, disobey his orders and interfere for the protection of the ship and the lives of those on board.").

While the Board's decision that Renwick was not relieved of responsibility to remain "on duty" by the master's countermand is consistent with the common law, the Board's decision need not mirror the common law to be valid. The relevant inquiry is whether 12 AAC 56.990(14), which the Board applied to reach its decision, is consistent with the Act. The Board could reasonably decide that life, property, and the marine environment are better served by a rule requiring pilots to remain on duty even if their orders are countermanded. While "[d]ivided authority in a ship with reference to the same subject-matter is certainly not to be encouraged," The Marcellus, 4 F. Cas. at 1145, the fact that a pilot's orders are countermanded does not mean that the pilot is at liberty to leave the ship. 12 AAC 56.990(14), which recognizes this rule, is consistent with the Act's goal of promoting safe pilotage.

We REVERSE the judgment of the superior court, and direct that it REMAND the case to the Board for such further proceedings as may come before it.