Will The Look-out Be Redundant? (Fall 98)

Visions of the future typically include higher efficiency, reduced costs and fatter bottom lines. In the ocean shipping industry, ship manning scales have been particularly attractive targets for reduction, and, in fact, modern ships operate with about half the crew they might have used even 30 years ago. The purser's department and the radio department are extinct in many shipping companies. The engineering department has been reduced due to engine room automation and nearly universal use of diesel engines, leaving many engine rooms unmanned. But reductions in the bridge watch have been particularly controversial. Where ships used to sail with at least three people on the navigation bridge watch, modern ships typically sail with only a helmsman and a watch officer, or in some cases with the watch officer alone. The historical third person, who was usually called "the look-out" in the past, is now absent from many bridge watches. Many question just how far the trend will continue and what the effect on safety will be. Will the look-out be redundant? If the term "look-out" is used to mean an individual watchstander assigned by the watch officer to scan the horizon, then that person is already gone from many, if not most, ships under most conditions. But if "look-out? is given the same meaning it has in the context of Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea (COLREGS), then the look-out will be around for a very long time to come, and the answer to the title question is unequivocally, "No".

Rule 5 is at the heart of this question, so the language of Rule 5 is worth reviewing carefully: "Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision."

In the past, as already noted, a "look-out" was assumed to be a person. And many people today still assume that look-out is an individual watchstander assigned to scan the horizon. But the term, as used by the rules and interpreted by the courts, denotes not only a person but also the systematic collection of relevant information. Rule 5 is in fact a performance standard rather than a technical standard. It specifies what function must be performed but does not involve itself in the technical details of how many people or what equipment is required to perform the function. This is an important distinction. Because it is not a technical standard, Rule 5 allows the ship's master and the watch officer a great deal of flexibility in determining exactly what means will be employed to collect information. At the same time, as a performance standard, Rule 5 holds the officer of the watch unrelentingly responsible to employ "all available means appropriate."

Day or night, in fair weather and foul, the requirement to maintain a proper look-out does not change. However, the means and method may with the prevailing circumstance and conditions. During the day, vessels can be seen at much greater distances, so a watch officer may be able to perform the look-out alone. But if the officer is tired or has to correct charts, this may prevent him or her from maintaining a proper look-out alone, so according to his or her judgement and the master's, additional resources may be required. In addition, the vessel's size, maneuverability, method of control, and the availability of an engine room watch should also be considered by the master to determine how best to maintain a proper look-out.

A proper look-out is a team effort for which each person (regardless of how many there may be) is competent in the use of equipment and diligent in providing information. The master determines the duties of each member of the team and ensures that a proper look-out is maintained at all times.

A proper look-out within Rule provides all the information needed to comply with the rules to prevent collisions. If the information collected by the look-out is insufficient, then the mariner must intensify his or her look-out efforts (for example, by turning on the radar) or reduce the need for information (for example, by slowing down a fogbound vessel).

Rule 5 requires that a look-out be maintained by sight, hearing and all available means appropriate. In this respect, a strong case can be made for accelerating the introduction and use of high-tech navigation systems. "High-technology navigation systems have matured to the point where, if used wisely and adequately supported, they have the potential to enhance maritime safety and transit efficiency significantly." However, new technologies also introduce new problems. They should not necessarily replace individual; rather they should be used to enhance the means by which the team maintains a proper look-out. This implies not only that bridge equipment (charts, binoculars, radar, ARPA, VHF, VTS and any piece of equipment or method for providing early detection to avoid collision) be kept up to date and in good repair, but also that the bridge watch members be properly trained to use it.

The prudent master cannot blindly use advances in technology to reduce the number of personnel available to maintain a look-out and carry out the duties of the watch. For example, it is not enough for the master to say that a helmsman is not needed because there is an autopilot. While Rule 5 does not address whether any humans may be replaced by equipment, an implied requirement in Rule 5 is that any trade-off between personnel and technology will be both "proper" and "appropriate." But just what constitutes proper and appropriate is very much open to question. Any useful technical standard would have to encompass not only the hardware, such as equipment design, bridge layout, communication, electronic navigation and instrumentation, but also the software, such as the ability to call on a qualified assistant, rest periods, absence of collateral duties on watch, weather traffic density, visibility, proximity of dangers to navigation, proximity to traffic separation schemes, voyage planning and delay periods for the deadman alarm. In other words, there are more relevant variables than any workable technical standard could handle. Even if an international technical standard were developed, it is doubtful that such a standard could take precedence over the performance standard Rule 5 in a court of law as the rule of maintaining a proper look-out is one of the strictest requirements in the law of admiralty. Time and again the courts have held mariners accountable to "maintain proper look-out by all means appropriate to the circumstances."

In the absence of an international technical standard that addresses combinations of hardware and software, the issue of what constitutes a proper look-out in the electronic age will continue to be unclear and uncomfortable for many mariners. Papers, articles, and regulations addressing "One Man Bridge Operation," (OMBO) have the luxury to deal with hardware and software issues separately, but the master is inescapably responsible minute by minute to choose an appropriate mix, and integrate the hardware and software into one effective look-out.

In fact, it would be difficult to argue that a binding technical standard even ought to be developed. For, uncomfortable as it may be for both mariner and standards setter, the master is still the one in the best position to "make a full appraisal of the situation.? The depth of discomfort in this respect may be the best measure of the value added by a master's experience and judgement.

The master has not been left completely to his own devices in setting the watch. The Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code (STEW Code) of 1995 contains international standards for the knowledge, understanding and proficiencies required of bridge watchstanders. Where Rule 5 states the basic performance standard, the STEW Code expands on principles to be observed in keeping a navigational watch and relevant factors to be taken into account in determining the composition of the watch. The STEW Code contains several requirements of particular relevance to the look-out:

The look-out must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper look-out and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned which could interfere with that task.

The duty of the look-out and helmsman are separate and the helmsman shall not be considered to be the look-out while steering, except in small ships where an unobstructed all-round view is provided at the steering station and there is no impairment of night vision or other impediment to the keeping of a proper look-out.

The officer of the watch may be the sole look-out in daylight provided that on each occasion: the situation has been carefully assessed and it has been established without doubt that it is safe to do so; full account has been taken of all relevant factors...Assistance is immediately available to be summoned to the bridge when any change in the situation so requires...at no time shall the bridge be left unattended."

Neither Rule 5 nor the STEW Code defines the role of the helmsman, only that the duties of the look-out and helmsman are separate. The implication of this is that if automation takes over the role of the helmsman, and monitoring the automation resides with the watch officer, then ships can be (and are) operated with just the watch officer and one other person on watch. Small ships (this team is not defined under STEW) set up for OMBO are allowed to operate with only a watch officer, even at night. The prevailing attitude allows for a reduced number of people involved in the role of look-out if there is an acceptable level of automation, but international standards do not state what should be acceptable.

Taken together, those points imply that a two person watch is envisioned under normal circumstances. Of course, extra watchstanders should be added when they are necessary to collect relevant information. Reduction to one person is to be entertained only under very carefully considered circumstances. Though reduced in number, the human element of the bridge watch appears secure.

The administration of some countries have authorized trials with one man bridge watches at night in accordance with The International Maritime Organization's circular, MSC/Circ.566, but the United States has objected to these trials. The Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC), an advisory body composed of representatives from many segments of the United States shipping industry which advises the United States Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation on navigation safety issues, has considered the implications of the practice of one-man bridge watches at night. This advisory group adopted the following resolution in May 1991.

NAVSAC views the practice of manning oceangoing vessels of over 1600 gross tons with a one-man bridge watch at night or in periods of restricted visibility as being unsafe considering existing technology.

The United States has communicated this position to the other countries of the world via IMO and has requested that other administrations direct their ships not to engage in such trials while navigating in waters subject to the restrictions of the United States.

It should be clear to all that the days when every watch included the lone look-out on the bow of the ship, dressed in oil skins, binoculars around his neck, with his wool cap pulled down over his ears, are over. While it may be appropriate to have a person watching from the bow in some cases, it is increasingly more desirable to have a qualified assistant available to the watch officer as part of the bridge management team. This qualified assistant should be capable of managing all the resources available to the team and should have basic knowledge in vessel control, use of the radars, ARPA, communications, navigation, and other bridge equipment. Such an assistant significantly enhances safety, especially in heavy traffic areas. In fact, in waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction, such an assistant is required for some ships: tank vessels must navigate with at least two licensed deck officers on watch on the bridge.

This requirement is an apparent step back from the pure performance standard of Rule 5. But it recognizes the same truth that inspired mariners to ask the question "will the look-out be redundant?" The truth is, machines do some things, particularly routine tasks, better than humans do, but humans are good at doing extraordinary things in uncertain circumstances. When the future is most predictable, as in open-ocean sailing, automation is desirable. But when uncertainty reigns, as in congested traffic areas, it is comforting to know that a human being is on watch: a trained and competent mariner with the ability to recognize when unspecified things are not right and the responsibility to do something about it.

The COLREGS were developed to prevent collisions. Sometimes things do go wrong, which brings up a last point. If a team has failed in maintaining a proper look-out, and a collision is imminent, the vessel must still preserve for herself the ultimate opportunity of escaping her predicament and avoiding disaster by exercise of experienced nautical judgement. For the foreseeable future, that will remain a uniquely human undertaking.