Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceudicals, S Ct - , June 28, 1993
The Supreme Court relaxed the standard for admission of scientific testimony regarding the effect of a drug on birth defects. The ruling - arising out of a California case where scientific testimony had been disallowed on whether a morning sickness drug had cause birth defects - allows the more flexible standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress in 1975.
Harry Blackman, in a unanimous decision for the Supreme Court wrote, "The rules of evidence... do assign the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand" .
The ruling which had been anxiously awaited by the legal and scientific community, comes as trial judges have been struggling with how to handle complex testimony in high-stakes environmental litigation and how to separate accurate, reliable information from "junk science" that could mislead jurors.
Before this decision, most federal courts relied on a 1923 federal ruling in Frye v United States, mandating the proposed scientific testimony be generally accepted by others in the field. To meet that standard, the technique must meet a peer review standard and must be "generally accepted".
This rule is now history. The Supreme Court buried that standard by saying it was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. A key rule governing expert testimony states, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, or experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Justice Blackmun said that while publication and peer review may help a judge decide that would-be testimony is relevant, it is not a prerequisite of admission.
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