The NTSB issued their report and recommendations in August 1990 on the sinking of the Tug BARCONA when its tow line was snagged by the submerged nuclear submarine USS HOUSTON near Catalina Island on 14 June 1989.
While the NTSB stated the probable cause of the casualty was the failure of the HOUSTON to detect the tug and its barges, it also listed as a probable cause "the lack of an emergency towline release mechanism operable from the pilothouse of the tug."
This criticism relating to the towing gear of the tug follows the finding of the State of Washington investigation into the collision of the tug OCEAN SERVICE with its barge NESTUCCA off of Grays Harbor Washington in December 1988. The investigative report of Captain Greiner and his MEC Associate Al Lucht stated that the failure of the towing cable which occurred before the collision was a result of the use of improper cable and the failure to use ordinary care in its maintenance. This is discussed in more detail in the companion article on page 3.
The NTSB issued a number of recommendations relating to tug safety:
1. Require (seek legislative authority if necessary) that all ocean towing vessels be equipped with an emergency towline release mechanism that can be operated from the pilothouse and the after steering station.
2. Require that all main deck doors be kept closed while underway at sea.
3. Install general alarms systems operable from the pilothouse.
4. Require all uninspected seagoing tugs to carry a[n] emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB).
When the towing cable was snagged, the stern of the tug was submerged so rapidly that no one could have gone aft to release the brake on the towing winch so as to take the pressure off of the towline which was pulling the tug under. A pilothouse release would have permitted this and may well have saved the tug.
The NTSB had previously recommended the requirement for a pilothouse release in their investigation into the sinking of the M/V EAGLE in 1983. While the Coast Guard concurred with their recommendation at that time, no requirement had been implemented. ABS did develop rules for a quick release device that became effective in May 1990, but these were voluntary.
Although NTSB believed that the hull of the tug may have been opened to the sea, the fact that one or more of the doors on the main deck were open, increased the rate at which the tug sank. This reduced the time during which someone not immediately near a door could escape.
The deckhand who did not survive the sinking and who was navigating the BARCONA at the time the HOUSTON snagged the towline was sent below to awaken the sleeping engineer. If the tug had a general alarm system, merely sounding the alarm could have awakened the engineer.
Because of the rapid sinking of the BARCONA, there was insufficient time to broadcast a "mayday." The Coast Guard did not receive notification until about two hours after the sinking. Had the tug carried an EPIRB, notification would have been much sooner and emergency forces could have been on scene sooner. Whether this could have changed the results in this case is problematical. However, it would increase the survivability in this and future accidents.
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