UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
DONALD COOK, JR.,
Plaintiff
Case No. C99-5353FDB
v.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF's MOTIONS
JOHN P. ANCICH, GOOD HARBOR
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FISHERIES, INC. and F/V HERITAGE,
FOR NEGLIGENCE PER SE AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE;
Defendant.
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
UNDER 46 U.S.C. §§ 10601, 11107 AND
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE REPLY
During the 1996 Southeast Alaska summer salmon season, plaintiff Donald
Cook, Jr. was a deckhand on the F/V HERITAGE, a 58 foot wood purse seine vessel.
Defendant John Ancich was the caption of the boat and principal of Good Harbor
Fisheries, Inc., the boat's owner. The parties entered into a contract on June
8, 1996 which specified the terms of plaintiff's employment. The contract was
signed by the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant signed it in his
capacity as skipper and expressly disclaimed signing in any other capacity
during his deposition.
On July 8, 1996, the boat was docked at Hoonah, Alaska. Cook, Ancich and the
other crew members were cleaning and repairing the purse seine net. The net was
rolled back over the power block from the stern to the mid-deck and piled by
Cook and another crew member at mid-deck. Ancich was operating the hydraulic
controls which maneuvered the net over the block. Part of the net tangled in an
attached half purse ring and hit Cook in the head when it came over the power
block.
The parties dispute the exact sequence of events that lead to Cook being
hit. However, all agree that he was not wearing a hard hat, had not been advised
to wear a hard hat and no hard hats were provided. All agree that during this
type of net repairing process, there is a risk of being hit on the head. All
agree that Cook would have been less injured if he had been wearing a hard hat.
However, the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment asks for a
judgment on applicable legal standards, not facts. The plaintiff argues that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) governs the working conditions of
seamen on the F/V HERITAGE. Further, if OSHA regulations apply, then the
defendant's failure to require and/or provide plaintiff with a hard hat leaves
the defendant liable for plaintiff's injuries.
The plaintiff's second motion for partial summary judgment asks the court to
find the contract between Cook and Ancich void for failure to comply with 46
U.S.C. § 10601, granting damages under § 11107. Finally, plaintiff requests an
extension of time to reply to defendant regarding the contract question.
DISCUSSION
Do OSHA standards apply to the F/V HERITAGE?
OSHA gives the Secretary of Labor jurisdiction over occupational health and
safety standards "with respect to employment performed in a workplace in a
state." 29 U.S.C. § 653(a); except where "other Federal agencies ...
exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations
affecting occupational safety or health." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1). The Ninth
Circuit has held that the boundaries of a state extend to the state's
territorial waters which are contained within a line "three geographical
miles" from the state's coastline. Herman v. Tidewater Pacific, Inc.,
160 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998), citing the Submerged Lands Act
43 U.S.C. § 1312. The dock at Hoonah, Alaska is within this boundary.
The F/V HERITAGE is an uninspected fishing vessel. 46 U.S.C. §§ 2101(43),
3301. It is subject to Coast Guard safety regulations but it is not as
thoroughly regulated or monitored as an inspected vessel. 46 U.S.C. §§ 3305,
3307, 3308. Where the Coast Guard has not exercised its authority to regulate
working conditions on uninspected vessels, OSHA is not preempted. Herman v.
Tidewater Pacific, Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1245, 1246 (9th Cir.
1998), citing Donovan v. Red Star Marine Services, 739 F.2d 774 (2nd
Cir. 1984) and In re Inspection of Norfolk Dredging Co., 783 F.2d 1526
(11th Cir. 1986). In Secretary of Labor v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries,
Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1699 (1992), the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission directly considered whether OSHA regulations were applicable to
uninspected fishing vessels. In that case, both the secretary and the Coast
Guard via an amicus brief argued that OSHA regulations were applicable
to the working conditions on the uninspected vessels in question.
OSHA regulations applied to the working conditions on the F/V HERITAGE at
the time of Cook's employment.
What is the effect of OSHA standards given the incorporation of FELA
into the Jones Act?
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688, grants a statutory right to seamen to sue
for personal injuries suffered in the course of employment where "all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply ..."
This language incorporates the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.
§ 53, which states:
In all actions ... to recover damages for personal injuries to an
employee, ... the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by
the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such
employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured be held
to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation
by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees
contributed to the injury ... of such employee.
(Emphasis in original.)
The impact of FELA liability standards on the Jones Act has been thoroughly
considered. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958); Herman
v. Tidewater Pacific, Inc., 160 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1998); Fuszek
v. Royal King Fisheries, Inc., 98 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996); Kopczynski
v. THE JACQUELINE, 742 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1984). In Kernan,
355 U.S. at 436-7, the Court held that seamen under the Jones Act were entitled
the "entire judicially developed doctrine of liability-granted to railroad
workers by the FELA." Thus, under FELA, there is negligence per se if a
statutory violation "contributes in fact to the death or injury in suit,
without regard to whether the injury flowing from the breach was the injury the
statute sought to prevent." Kernan, 355 U.S. at 433.
The Ninth Circuit has held that violation of Coast Guard regulations is
negligence per se if five elements are met: "(1) a violation of Coast Guard
regulations, (2) the plaintiff's membership in the class of intended
beneficiaries of the regulations, (3) injury of a type against which the
regulations are designed to protect, (4) the unexcused nature of the regulatory
violation, and (5) causation." Fuszek, 98 F.3d at 517.
In Herman supra, the court upheld the Secretary's citations of
Tidewater Pacific, Inc. for violations of the same general Occupational Health
and Safety Standards at issue here. In Kopczynski, a seaman brought suit
under the Jones Act for violation of OSHA regulations of Shipyard Employment. Kopczynski,
742 F.3d at 558. The Kopczynski court held that these regulations were not
applicable to Kopczynski in his capacity as a seaman. Id. The court
specifically declined to decide in what circumstances OSHA regulations would
apply to seamen and what the impact on the FELA negligence standard would be.
In this case, I consider the Coast Guard and OSHA regulations to be
functionally equivalent. These agencies agree that they share jurisdiction over
vessels of this class. There are no Coast Guard regulations on protective
equipment and OSHA specifically states in directive CPL 2-1.20 that the
protective equipment provision in 29 C.F.R. 1910(I) is applicable and
enforceable on uninspected fishing vessels.
Thus, 29 C.F.R. 1910(I) is a safety statute, enacted for the benefit of a
class of workers, to which plaintiff belongs, designed to protect workers from
head injuries, there was no excuse for defendant's violation and injury
resulted. Under FELA negligence standards incorporated by the Jones Act, the
defendant is liable as a matter of law and no deduction for contributory
negligence will be allowed.
What is the status of the employment contract under 46 U.S.C. §§
10601, 11107?
The plaintiff claims that the contract between him and the defendant must
fail under 46 U.S.C. 10601(b) because it was not expressly signed by the owner
of the F/V HERITAGE. However, the authority cited by plaintiff deals with the
rights of seamen under oral contracts which are clearly void. I am not convinced
that the statutory remedy under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 applies here.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
(1) The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (docket #15) on
negligence per se and contributory negligence is granted.
(2) The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment re 46 U.S.C. §§
10601, 11107 (docket #29) is denied.
(3) The plaintiff's motion for enlargement of time (docket #28) is moot.
DATED this 23 day of August, 2000.
/s/ Franklin D. Burgess
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE